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Abstract. We study the problem of finding approximate Nash equilibria
that satisfy certain conditions, such as providing good social welfare. In
particular, we study the problem -NE δ-SW: find an -approximate Nash
equilibrium (-NE) that is within δ of the best social welfare achievable
by an -NE. Our main result is that, if the randomized exponential-time
hypothesis (RETH) is true, then solving
(
1
8
−O(δ))-NE O(δ)-SW for an
n × n bimatrix game requires nΩ˜(δΛ logn) time, where Λ is a constant.
Building on this result, we show similar conditional running time lower
bounds on a number of decision problems for approximate Nash equilibria
that do not involve social welfare, including maximizing or minimizing a
certain player’s payoff, or finding approximate equilibria contained in a
given pair of supports. We show quasi-polynomial lower bounds for these
problems assuming that RETH holds, and these lower bounds apply to
-Nash equilibria for all  < 1
8
. The hardness of these other decision
problems has so far only been studied in the context of exact equilibria.
1 Introduction
One of the most fundamental problems in game theory is to find a Nash equilib-
rium of a game. Often, we are not interested in finding any Nash equilibrium, but
instead we want to find one that also satisfies certain constraints. For example,
we may want to find a Nash equilibrium that provides high social welfare, which
is the sum of the player’s payoffs.
In this paper we study such problems for bimatrix games, which are two-
player strategic-form games. Unfortunately, for bimatrix games, it is known that
these problems are hard. Finding any Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game is
PPAD-complete [10], while finding a constrained Nash equilibrium turns out to
be even harder. Gilboa and Zemel [16] studied several decision problems related
to Nash equilibria. They proved that it is NP-complete to decide whether there
exist Nash equilibria in bimatrix games with some “desirable” properties, such as
high social welfare. Conitzer and Sandholm [7] extended the list of NP-complete
problems of [16] and furthermore proved inapproximability results for some of
them. Recently, Garg et al. [15] and Bilo and Mavronicolas [4] extended these
results to many player games and provided ETR-completeness results for them.
? The authors were supported by EPSRC grant EP/L011018/1. The full version of
this paper, with complete proofs, is available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1608.03574.
Approximate equilibria. Due to the apparent hardness of finding exact Nash
equilibria, focus has shifted to approximate equilibria. There are two natural
notions of approximate equilibrium, both of which will be studied in this paper.
An -approximate Nash equilibrium (-NE) requires that each player has an
expected payoff that is within  of their best response payoff. An -well-supported
Nash equilibrium (-WSNE) requires that both players only play strategies whose
payoff is within  of the best response payoff. Every -WSNE is an -NE but the
converse does not hold, so a WSNE is a more restrictive notion.
There has been a long line of work on finding approximate equilibria [5, 8,
11–13, 18, 22]. Since we use an additive notion of approximation, it is common to
rescale the game so that the payoffs lie in [0, 1], which allows different algorithms
to be compared. The state of the art for polynomial-time algorithms is the fol-
lowing. There is a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an 0.3393-NE [22],
and a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a 0.6528-WSNE [8].
There is also a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme (QPTAS) for
finding approximate Nash equilibria. The algorithm of Lipton, Markakis, and
Mehta finds an -NE in nO(
logn
2
) time [19]. They proved that there is always
an -NE with logarithmic support, and then uses a brute-force search over all
possible candidates to find one. We will refer to their algorithm as the LMM
algorithm.
A recent breakthrough of Rubinstein implies that we cannot do better than
a QPTAS like the LMM algorithm [21]: assuming the ETH for PPAD (PETH),
there is a small constant, ∗, such that for  < ∗, every algorithm for finding
an -NE requires quasi-polynomial time. Briefly, PETH is the conjecture that
EndOfTheLine, the canonical PPAD-complete problem, cannot be solved faster
than exponential time.
Constrained approximate Nash equilibria. While deciding whether a game
has an exact Nash equilibrium that satisfies certain constraints is NP-hard for
most interesting constraints, this is not the case for approximate equilibria, be-
cause the LMM algorithm can be adapted to provide a QPTAS for them. The
question then arises whether these results are tight.
Let the problem -NE δ-SW be the problem of finding an -NE whose social
welfare is within δ of the best social welfare that can be achieved by an -NE.
Hazan and Krauthgamer [17] and Austrin, Braverman and Chlamtac [3] proved
that there is a small but constant  such that -NE -SW is at least as hard
as finding a hidden clique of size O(log n) in the random graph Gn,1/2. This
was further strengthened by Braverman, Ko, and Weinstein [6] who showed
a lower bound based on the exponential-time hypothesis (ETH), which is the
conjecture that any deterministic algorithm for 3SAT requires 2Ω(n) time. More
precisely, they showed that under the ETH there is a small constant  such that
any algorithm for O()-NE O()-SW1 requires npoly() log(n)
1−o(1)
time2. We shall
refer to this as the BKW result.
It is worth noting that the Rubinstein’s hardness result [21] almost makes
this result redundant. If one is willing to accept that PETH is true, which is a
stronger conjecture than ETH, then Rubinstein’s result says that for small  we
require quasi-polynomial time to find any -NE, which obviously implies that
the same lower bound applies to -NE δ-SW for any δ.
Our results. Our first result is a lower bound for the problem of finding -NE
δ-SW. The randomized ETH (RETH) is the conjecture that any randomized
algorithm for 3SAT requires 2Ω(n) time. We show that, assuming RETH, there
exists a small constant ∆ such that for all δ ∈ [1/n,∆] the problem
(
1−4g·δ
8
)
-NE(
g·δ
4
)
-SW requires nΩ˜(δ
Λ logn) time3, where g = 1138 , and Λ is a constant.
To understand this result, let us compare it to the BKW result. First, observe
that as δ gets smaller, the  in our -NE gets larger, whereas the approximate
Nash equilibria in the BKW result get smaller. Asymptotically, our  approaches
1/8. Moreover, since δ ≤ 1, our lower bound applies to all -NE with  ≤ 1−4g8 ≈
0.1214. This is orders of magnitude larger than the inapproximability bound
given by Rubinstein’s hardness result, and so is not made redundant by that
result. In short, our hardness result is about the hardness of obtaining good social
welfare, rather than the hardness of simply finding an approximate equilibrium.
Secondly, when compared to the BKW result, we obtain a slightly better
lower bound. The exponent in their lower bound is logarithmic only in the limit,
while ours is always logarithmic. In particular, we obtain quasi-polynomial lower
bounds whenever δ is constant.
Finally, our result uses a stronger conjecture when compared to the BKW
result. While they assume ETH, our result requires that we assume RETH. This
is a stronger conjecture, since even if ETH is true, there may exist randomized
sub-exponential algorithms for 3SAT. This means that our result is ultimately
incomparable to the BKW result: we obtain a lower bound for larger , and we
have a better lower bound on the running time, but we do so by assuming a
stronger conjecture.
To prove our result, we reduce from the problem of approximating the value
of a free game. Aaronson, Impagliazzo, and Moshkovitz showed quasi-polynomial
lower bounds for this problem assuming ETH [1]. In fact, they give two different
lower bounds: the high error result shows a quasi-polynomial lower bound for
determining whether the value of the game is 1 or 1 − δ for small δ, while
the low error result shows a weaker almost-quasi-polynomial lower bound on
1 While the proof in [6] produces a lower bound for 0.8-NE (1−O())-SW, this is in
a game with maximum payoff O(1/). Therefore, when the payoffs in this game are
rescaled to [0, 1], the resulting lower bound only applies to -NE -SW.
2 Although the paper claims that they obtain a nO˜(logn) lower bound, the proof reduces
from the low error result from [1] (cf. Theorem 36 in [2]), which gives only the weaker
lower bound of npoly() log(n)
1−o(1)
.
3 Here Ω˜(logn) means Ω( logn
(log logn)c
) for some constant c.
determining whether the value of the game is 1 or δ for small δ. The BKW
result was proved via a reduction from the low error case, while our result uses
the high error case. We reduce the free game to a bimatrix game, and prove
that in any -NE of the game, the players must simulate the free game well
enough so that we can determine whether the value of the free game is 1 or
1− δ. Our reduction is substantially different from the BKW reduction: we use
a sub-sampling result for free games to reduce the number of questions in the
free game, and then we use a different method to force the players to simulate
the free game.
Once we have our lower bound on the problem of finding -NE δ-SW, we use
it to prove lower bounds for other problems regarding constrained approximate
NEs and WSNEs. Table 1 gives a list of the problems that we consider. For each
one, we provide a reduction from -NE δ-SW to that problem. Ultimately, we
prove that if RETH is true, then for every  < 18 finding an -NE with the given
property requires nΩ˜(logn) time.
Problem description Problem definition
Problem 1: Large payoffs u ∈ (0, 1] Is there an -NE (x,y) such that
min(xTRy,xTCy) ≥ u?
Problem 2: Small total payoff v ∈ [0, 2) Is there an -NE (x,y) such that
xTRy + xTCy ≤ v?
Problem 3: Small payoff u ∈ [0, 1) Is there an -NE (x,y) such that xTRy ≤ u?
Problem 4: Restricted support S ⊂ [n] Is there an -NE (x,y) with supp(x) ⊆ S?
Problem 5: Two -NE d ∈ (0, 1] apart
in Total Variation (TV) distance
Are there two -NE with TV distance ≥ d?
Problem 6: Small largest probability
p ∈ (0, 1)
Is there an -NE (x,y) with maxi xi ≤ p?
Problem 7: Large total support size Is there an -WSNE (x,y) such that
k ∈ [n] |supp(x)|+ |supp(y)| ≥ 2k?
Problem 8: Large smallest support size
k ∈ [n]
Is there an -WSNE (x,y) such that
min{|supp(x)|, |supp(y)|} ≥ k?
Problem 9: Large support size k ∈ [n] Is there an -WSNE (x,y) such that
|supp(x)| ≥ k?
Problem 10: Restricted support Is there an -WSNE (x,y) with SR ⊆ supp(x)?
SR ⊆ [n]
Table 1: The decision problems that we consider. All of them take as input a bimatrix
games and a quality of approximation  ∈ (0, 1). Problems 1 - 6 relate to -NE, and
Problems 7 - 10 relate to -WSNE.
Other related work. The only positive result for finding -NE with good social
welfare that we are aware of was given by Czumaj, Fasoulakis, and Jurdzin´ski [9].
They showed that if there is a polynomial-time algorithm for finding an -NE,
then for all ′ >  there is also a polynomial-time algorithm for finding an ′-NE
that is within a constant multiplicative approximation of the best social welfare.
They also give further results for the case where  > 12 .
2 Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, we use [n] to denote the set of integers {1, 2, . . . , n}. An
n× n bimatrix game is a pair (R,C) of two n× n matrices: R gives payoffs for
the row player and C gives the payoffs for the column player.
Each player has n pure strategies. To play the game, both players simultane-
ously select a pure strategy: the row player selects a row i ∈ [n], and the column
player selects a column j ∈ [n]. The row player then receives payoff Ri,j , and
the column player receives payoff Ci,j .
A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over [n]. We denote a mixed
strategy for the row player as a vector x of length n, such that xi is the prob-
ability that the row player assigns to pure strategy i. A mixed strategy of the
column player is a vector y of length n, with the same interpretation. If x and y
are mixed strategies for the row and the column player, respectively, then we
call (x,y) a mixed strategy profile. The expected payoff for the row player under
strategy profile (x,y) is given by xTRy and for the column player by xTCy.
We denote the support of a strategy x as supp(x), which gives the set of pure
strategies i such that xi > 0.
Nash equilibria. Let y be a mixed strategy for the column player. The set of
pure best responses against y for the row player is the set of pure strategies that
maximize the payoff against y. More formally, a pure strategy i ∈ [n] is a best
response against y if, for all pure strategies i′ ∈ [n] we have: ∑j∈[n] yj · Ri,j ≥∑
j∈[n] yj ·Ri′,j . Column player best responses are defined analogously.
A mixed strategy profile (x,y) is a mixed Nash equilibrium if every pure
strategy in supp(x) is a best response against y, and every pure strategy in
supp(y) is a best response against x. Nash [20] showed that every bimatrix
game has a mixed Nash equilibrium. Observe that in a Nash equilibrium, each
player’s expected payoff is equal to their best response payoff.
Approximate Equilibria. There are two commonly studied notions of ap-
proximate equilibrium, and we consider both of them in this paper. The first
notion is that of an -approximate Nash equilibrium (-NE), which weakens the
requirement that a player’s expected payoff should be equal to their best response
payoff. Formally, given a strategy profile (x,y), we define the regret suffered by
the row player to be the difference between the best response payoff and the
actual payoff: maxi∈[n]
(
(R · y)i
) − xT · R · y. Regret for the column player is
defined analogously. We have that (x,y) is an -NE if and only if both players
have regret less than or equal to .
The other notion is that of an -approximate-well-supported equilibrium (-
WSNE), which weakens the requirement that players only place probability on
best response strategies. Given a strategy profile (x,y) and a pure strategy
j ∈ [n], we say that j is an -best-response for the row player if: maxi∈[n]
(
(R ·
y)i
)− (R ·y)j ≤ . An -WSNE requires that both players only place probability
on -best-responses. Formally, the row player’s pure strategy regret under (x,y) is
defined to be: maxi∈[n]
(
(R ·y)i
)−mini∈supp(x) ((R ·y)i). Pure strategy regret for
the column player is defined analogously. A strategy profile (x,y) is an -WSNE
if both players have pure strategy regret less than or equal to .
Since approximate Nash equilibria use an additive notion of approximation,
it is standard practice to rescale the input game so that all payoffs lie in the
range [0, 1], which allows us to compare different results on this topic. For the
most part, we follow this convention. However, for our result in Section 3, we
will construct a game whose payoffs do not lie in [0, 1]. In order to simplify the
proof, we will prove results about approximate Nash equilibria in the unscaled
game, and then rescale the game to [0, 1] at the very end. To avoid confusion,
we will refer to an -approximate Nash equilibrium in this game as an -UNE,
to mark that it is an additive approximation in an unscaled game.
Two-prover games. A two-prover game is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Two-prover game). A two-prover game T is defined by a tuple
(X,Y,A,B,D, V ) where X and Y are finite sets of questions, A and B are finite
sets of answers, D is a probability distribution defined over ∈ X × Y , and V is
a verification function of the form V : X × Y ×A×B → {0, 1}.
The game is a co-operative game played between two players, who are called
Merlin1 and Merlin2, and an adjudicator called Arthur. At the start of the game,
Arthur chooses a question pair (x, y) ∈ X × Y randomly according to D. He
then sends x to Merlin1 and y to Merlin2. Crucially, Merlin1 does not know the
question sent to Merlin2 and vice versa. Having received x, Merlin1 then chooses
an answer from A and sends it back to Arthur. Merlin2 similarly picks an answer
from B and returns it to Arthur. Arthur then computes p = V (x, y, a, b) and
awards payoff p to both players. The size of the game, denoted |T | = |X × Y ×
A×B| is the total number of entries needed to represent V as a table.
A strategy for Merlin1 is a function a : X → A that gives an answer for
every possible question, and likewise a strategy for Merlin2 is a function b : Y →
B. We define Si to be the set of all strategies for Merlini. The payoff of the
game under a pair of strategies (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2 is denoted as p(T , s1, s2) =
E(x,y)∼D[V (x, y, s1(x), s2(y))].
The value of the game, denoted ω(T ), is the maximum expected payoff to
the Merlins when they play optimally: ω(T ) = maxs1∈S1 maxs2∈S2 p(T , s1, s2).
Free games. A two-prover game is called a free game if the probability distri-
bution D is the uniform distribution U over X×Y . In particular, this means that
there is no correlation between the question sent to Merlin1 and the question
sent to Merlin2. We are interested in the problem of approximating the value of
a free game within an additive error of δ.
FreeGameδ
Input: A free game T and a constant δ > 0.
Output: A value p such that | ω(T )− p | ≤ δ.
The exponential time hypothesis (ETH) is the conjecture that any determin-
istic algorithm for solving 3SAT requires 2Ω(n) time. The randomized exponential
time hypothesis (RETH) is the same hypothesis, but for randomized algorithms.
Aaronson, Impagliazzo, and Moshkovitz have shown that, if ETH holds, then we
have the following inapproximability result [1].
Theorem 2 (Theorem 32 in [2]). If the ETH holds, then there exists a con-
stant ∆ such that for all δ ∈ [1/n,∆] the problem FreeGameδ cannot be solved
faster than n
O˜(logn)
δ .
This theorem was proved by providing a family of games such that, each
game F had either ω(F) = 1, or ω(F) < 1 − δ, and showing that it is hard to
decide which of these is the case. Theorem 2 produces a free game where the
size of the question sets X and Y is proportional to the size of the answer sets
A and B. For our proof we would like the size of X and Y to be logarithmic in
the size of A and B. Fortunately, this can be achieved by applying the following
sub-sampling result from the same paper. Since our results will rely on this sub-
sampling lemma, our lower bounds will depend on RETH, rather than ETH.
Lemma 3 (Corollary 46 in [2]). Given a free game F = (X,Y,A,B,U , V )
and  > 0, we can randomly select a free game F ′ = (X ′, Y ′, A,B,U , V ) such
that |X| = |Y | = 2 · −Λ · log(|A|+ |B|) for some constant Λ such that, with high
probability, we have |ω(F)− ω(F ′)| ≤ .
3 Hardness of approximating social welfare
Overview. In this section, we study the following social welfare problem. The
social welfare of a pair of strategies (x,y) is denoted by SW(x,y) and is defined
to be xTRy + xTCy. Given an  ≥ 0, we define the set of all  equilibria as
E = {(x,y) : (x,y) is an -NE}. Then, we define the best social welfare
achievable by an -NE in G as BSW(G, ) = max{SW(x,y) : (x,y) ∈ E}.
Using these definitions we now define the main problem that we consider:
-NE δ-SW
Input: A game G, and two constants , δ > 0.
Output: An -NE (x,y) s.t. SW(x,y) is within δ of BSW(G, ).
We show a lower bound for this problem by reducing from FreeGameδ. Let F
be a free game of size n from the family of free games that were used to prove
Theorem 2. We have that either ω(F) = 1 or ω(F) < 1 − δ for some fixed
constant δ, and that it is hard to determine which of these is the case. We will
construct a game G such that for  = 1− 4g · δ, where g < 512 is a fixed constant
that we will define at the end of the proof, we have the following properties.
– (Completeness) If ω(F) = 1, then the unscaled BSW(G, ) = 2.
– (Soundness) If ω(F) < 1− δ, then the unscaled BSW(G, ) < 2(1− g · δ).
This will allow us to prove our lower bound using Theorem 2.
3.1 The construction
The first step of the proof is to apply Lemma 3 to F with  = δ/2 to produce a
free game Fs = (X,Y,A,B,U , V ) that will be fixed for the rest of this section.
Since the question sets in F have size O(|F|), we have that the question sets X
and Y in Fs have size log(|F|). Furthermore, with high probability, it is hard to
decide whether ω(Fs) = 1 or ω(Fs) = 1 − δ/2. Next, we use Fs to construct a
bimatrix game, which we will denote as G throughout the rest of this section. The
game is built out of four subgames, which are arranged and defined as follows.
@
@
I
II
R −D2
C D2
D1 0
−D1 0
– The game (R,C) is built from Fs in the following way. Each row of the
game corresponds to a pair (x, a) ∈ X ×A and each column corresponds to
a pair (y, b) ∈ Y × B. Since all free games are cooperative, the payoff for
each strategy pair (x, a), (y, b) is defined to be R(x,a),(y,b) = C(x,a),(y,b) =
V (x, y, a(x), b(y)).
– The game (D1,−D1) is a zero-sum game. The game is a slightly modified
version of a game devised by Feder, Nazerzadeh, and Saberi [14]. Let H be
the set of all functions of the form f : Y → {0, 1} such that f(y) = 1 for
exactly half4 of the elements y ∈ Y . The game has |Y ×B| columns and |H|
rows. For all f ∈ H and all (y, b) ∈ Y the payoffs are
(D1)f,(y,b) =
{
4
1+4g·δ if f(y) = 1,
0 otherwise.
– The game (−D2, D2) is built in the same way as the game (D1,−D1), but
with the roles of the players swapped. That is, each column of (−D2, D2)
corresponds to a function that picks half of the elements of X.
– The game (0, 0) is a game in which both players have zero matrices.
4 If |Y | is not even, then we can create a new free game in which each question in |Y |
appears twice. This will not change the value of the free game.
Observe that the size of (R,C) is the same as the size of Fs, which is at
most |F|. The game (D1,−D1) has the same number of columns as C, and the
number of rows is at most 2|Y | ≤ 22δ−Λ log |F| = |F|2δ−Λ , where Λ is the constant
obtained from Lemma 3. By the same reasoning, the number of columns in
(−D2, D2) is at most |F|2δ−Λ . Thus, the size of G is |F|O(δ−Λ), and in particular,
for every constant δ > 0, this reduction is polynomial.
3.2 Completeness
To prove completeness, it suffices to show that, if ω(Fs) = 1, then there exists a
(1−4g ·δ)-UNE of G that has social welfare 2. To do this, assume that ω(Fs) = 1,
and take a pair of optimal strategies (s1, s2) for Fs and turn them into strategies
for the players in G. More precisely, the row player will place probability 1|X| on
each answer chosen by s1, and the column player will place probability
1
|Y | on
each answer chosen by s2. By construction, this gives both players payoff 1, and
hence the social welfare is 2. The hard part is to show that this is an approximate
equilibrium, and in particular, that neither player can gain by playing a strategy
in (D1,−D1) or (−D2, D2). We prove this in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. If ω(Fs) = 1, then there exists a (1 − 4g · δ)-UNE (x,y) of G with
SW(x,y) = 2.
3.3 Soundness
We now suppose that ω(Fs) < 1−δ/2, and we will prove that all (1−4g ·δ)-UNE
provide social welfare at most 2− 2g · δ. Throughout this subsection, we will fix
(x,y) to be a (1 − 4g · δ)-UNE of G. We begin by making a simple observation
about the amount of probability that is placed on (R,C).
Lemma 5. If SW(x,y) > 2−2g ·δ, then x places at least (1−g ·δ) probability on
rows in (R,C), and y places at least (1− g · δ) probability on columns in (R,C).
So, for the rest of this subsection, we can assume that both x and y place at
least 1− g · δ probability on the subgame (R,C). We will ultimately show that,
if this is the case, then both players have payoff at most 1 − 12 · δ + mg · δ for
some constant m that will be derived during the proof. Choosing g = 1/(2m+2)
then ensures that both players have payoff at most 1− g · δ, and therefore that
the social welfare is at most 2− 2g · δ.
A two-prover game. We use (x,y) to create a two-prover game. First, we
define two distributions that capture the marginal probability that a question is
played by x or y. Formally, we define a distribution x′ over X and a distribution
y′ over Y such that for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y we have x′(x) = ∑a∈A x(x, a), and
y′(y) =
∑
b∈B y(y, b). By Lemma 5, we can assume that ‖x′‖1 ≥ 1 − g · δ and
‖y′‖1 ≥ 1− g · δ.
Our two-prover game will have the same question sets, answer sets, and
verification function as Fs, but a different distribution over the question sets.
Let T(x,y) = (X,Y,A,B,D, V ), where D is the product of x′ and y′. Note that
we have cheated slightly here, since D is not actually a probability distribution.
If ‖D‖1 = c < 1, then we can think of this as Arthur having a 1− c probability
of not sending any questions to the Merlins and awarding them payoff 0.
The strategies x and y can also be used to give a us a strategy for the Merlins
in T(x,y). Without loss of generality, we can assume that for each question x ∈ X
there is exactly one answer a ∈ A such that x(x, a) > 0, because if there are two
answers a1 and a2 such that x(x, a1) > 0 and x(x, a2) > 0, then we can shift all
probability onto the answer with (weakly) higher payoff, and (weakly) improve
the payoff to the row player. Since (R,C) is cooperative, this can only improve
the payoff of the columns in (R,C), and since the row player does not move
probability between questions, the payoff of the columns in (−D2, D2) does not
change either. Thus, after shifting, we arrive at a (1 − 4g · δ)-UNE of G whose
social welfare is at least as good as SW(x,y). Similarly, we can assume that for
each question y ∈ Y there is exactly one answer b ∈ B such that y(y, b) > 0.
So, we can define a strategy sx for Merlin1 in the following way. For each ques-
tion x ∈ X, the strategy sx selects the unique answer a ∈ A such that x(x, a) > 0.
The strategy sy for Merlin2 is defined symmetrically.
We will use T(x,y) as an intermediary between G and Fs by showing that
the payoff of (x,y) in G is close to the payoff of (sx, sy) in T(x,y), and that the
payoff of (sx, sy) in T(x,y) is close to the payoff of (sx, sy) in Fs. Since we have
a bound on the payoff of any pair of strategies in Fs, this will ultimately allow
us to bound the payoff to both players when (x,y) is played in G.
Relating G to T(x,y). For notational convenience, let us define pr(G,x,y) and
pc(G,x,y) to be the payoff to the row player and column player, respectively,
when (x,y) is played in G. We begin by showing that the difference between
pr(G,x,y) and p(T(x,y), sx, sy) is small. Once again we prove this for the payoff
of the row player, but the analogous result also holds for the column player.
Lemma 6. We have |pr(G,x,y)− p(T(x,y), sx, sy)| ≤ 4g · δ.
Relating T(x,y) to Fs. First we show that if (x,y) is indeed a (1 − 4g · δ)-
UNE, then x′ and y′ must be close to uniform over the questions. We prove this
for y′, but the proof can equally well be applied to x′. The idea is that, if y′ is
sufficiently far from uniform, then there is set B ⊆ Y of |Y |/2 columns where y′
places significantly more than 0.5 probability. This, in turn, means that the row
of (D1,−D1) that corresponds to B, will have payoff at least 2, while the payoff
of (x,y) can be at most 1 + 3g · δ, and so (x,y) would not be a (1− 4g · δ)-UNE.
We formalise this idea in the following lemma. Define uX to be the uniform
distribution over X, and uY to be the uniform distribution over Y .
Lemma 7. We have ‖uY − y′‖1 < 16g · δ and ‖uX − x′‖1 < 16g · δ.
With Lemma 7 at hand, we can now prove that the difference between
p(T(x,y), sx, sy) and p(Fs, sx, sy) must be small. This is because the question
distribution D used in T(x,y)is a product of two distributions that are close to
uniform, while the question distribution U used in Fs is a product of two uniform
distributions. In the following lemma, we show that if we transform D into U ,
then we do not change the payoff of (sx, sy) very much.
Lemma 8. We have |p(T(x,y), sx, sy)− p(Fs, sx, sy)| ≤ 64g · δ.
Completing the soundness proof. The following lemma uses the bounds
derived in Lemmas 6 and 8, along with a suitable setting for g, to bound the
payoff of both players when (x,y) is played in G.
Lemma 9. If g = 1138 , then both players have payoff at most 1−g ·δ when (x,y)
is played in G.
Hence, we have proved that SW(x,y) ≤ 2− 2g · δ.
3.4 The result
We can now state the theorem that we have proved in this section. We first
rescale the game so that it lies in [0, 1]. The maximum payoff in G is 41+4g·δ ≤ 4,
and the minimum payoff is − 41+4g·δ ≥ −4. To rescale this game, we add 4 to all
the payoffs, and then divide by 8. Let us refer to the scaled game as Gs. Observe
that an -UNE in G is a 8 -NE in Gs since adding a constant to all payoffs does
not change the approximation guarantee, but dividing all payoffs by a constant
does change the approximation guarantee. So, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 10. If RETH holds, then there exists a constant ∆ such that for all
δ ∈ [1/n,∆] the problem ( 1−4g·δ8 )-NE g4 · δ-SW, where g = 1138 , cannot be solved
faster than nO˜(δ
Λ logn), for some fixed constant Λ.
4 Hardness results for other decision problems
In this section we study a range of decision problems associated with approxi-
mate equilibria. Most are known to be NP-complete for the case of exact Nash
equilibria [16, 7]. Table 1 shows all of the decision problems that we consider.
For each problem, the input includes a bimatrix game and a quality of approx-
imation  ∈ (0, 1). We consider decision problems related to both -NE and
-WSNE. Since -NE is a weaker concept than -WSNE, the hardness results for
-NE imply the same hardness for -WSNE. We consider problems for -WNSE
only where the corresponding problem for -NE is trivial. For example, observe
that approximate -NE with large support is a trivial problem, since we can
always add a tiny amount of probability to each pure strategy without changing
our expected payoff very much.
Our conditional quasi-polynomial lower bounds will hold for all  < 18 . Thus
fix ∗ < 18 for the rest of this section. We will appeal to Theorem 10, and thus we
compute from ∗ the parameters n and δ that we require to apply this theorem.
In particular, compute δ∗ to solve ∗ = ( 1−4g·δ
∗
8 ), which comes from Theorem 10,
and choose n∗ as 1δ∗ . Then, for n > n
∗ and δ = δ∗ we can apply Theorem 10
to bound the social welfare acheivable if ω(Fs) < 1 − δ∗ as u = 68 − 1522δ∗.
Theorem 10 implies that in order to decide whether the game Gs possess an
∗-NE that yields social welfare strictly greater than u requires nO˜(logn) time,
where δ no longer appears in the exponent since we have fixed it as a constant δ∗
according to our choice of ∗.
The hardness of Problem 1 is a corollary of Theorem 10 when we set u = 38 .
For the other problems in Table 1, we use Gs to construct two new games: G′,
which adds one row and column to Gs, is used to show hardness of Problems 2 - 9,
and G′′, which in turn adds one row and column to G′, is used to show hardness
of Problem 10. We define G′ and G′′ using the constants u and ∗ fixed above.
The game G′ extends Gs by adding the pure strategy i for the row player, and
the pure strategy j for the column player, with payoffs as shown in Figure 1.
G ′ =
j
0, 3
8
+ ∗
Gs ...
0, 3
8
+ ∗
i 3
8
+ ∗, 0 · · · 3
8
+ ∗, 0 1, 1
Fig. 1: The game G′.
The payoffs for i and j were chosen so that: If the game Gs possess an ∗-NE
with social welfare 68 , then G′ posses at least one ∗-NE where the players do
not play the pure strategies i and j; if every ∗-NE of the game Gs yields social
welfare at most u, then in every ∗-NE of G′, the players place almost all of their
probability on i and j respectively. Lemmas 11 and 12 show further properties
that hold in the first case but not the second.
Notice that the expected payoff for the row player from the pure strategy i is
at least 38 + 
∗ irrespective of the strategy the column player chooses. The same
holds for the column player and the pure strategy j, i.e., the expected payoff that
the column players gets from the pure strategy j is at least 38 + 
∗ irrespective of
the strategy chosen by the row player. In what follows we will use SR (SC), or S
when it is clear from the context, to denote the set of pure strategies available
to the row (column) from the (R,C) part of Gs that corresponds to different
questions in the free game Fs.
First, we derive some properties of the equilibria of G′ when Gs posses an
∗-NE with social welfare 68 .
Lemma 11. If Gs posses an ∗-NE (x,y) with social welfare 68 , then (x,y) is
an ∗-WSNE for G′ such that:
(a) xTRy = 38 and x
TCy = 38 ,
(b) supp(x) ⊆ SR and supp(y) ⊆ SC ,
(c) |supp(x)| = |SR| and |supp(y)| = |SC |,
(d) maxi xi ≤ 1|SR| and maxj yj ≤ 1|SC | .
Next, we prove certain properties that all ∗-NE and ∗-WSNE of G′ possess
if every ∗-NE of Gs yields social welfare at most u.
Lemma 12. If every ∗-NE of Gs yields social welfare at most u, then in every
∗-NE (x,y) of G′ it holds that:
(α) xi > 1− ∗ and yj > 1− ∗,
(β) xTRy > 1− 2∗ and xTCy > 1− 2∗.
Furthermore, in every ∗-WSNE (x,y) of G′ it holds that
(γ) |supp(x)| = |supp(y)| = 1.
Observe that the combination of the claims of Lemmas 11 and 12 give the de-
sired hardness results for the Problems 2 - 9. The combination of claim (a)
from Lemma 11 with the claim (β) from Lemma 12 gives the hardness result
for the Problems 2 and 3; the combination of (b) with (α) gives the hardness
for Problems 4 and 5; the combination of (d) with (α) gives the hardness for
the Problem 6; and finally that hardness of Problems 7 - 9 follows from the
combination of (c) with (γ).
For Problem 10, we define a new game G′′ by extending G′. We add the
new pure strategy i′ for the row player and the new pure strategy j′ for the
column player, with payoffs constructed as shown in Figure 2. We prove that if
the game Gs posses an ∗-NE with social welfare 38 , then the game G′′ possess
an ∗-WSNE (x,y) such that i′ ∈ supp(x). Furthermore, we prove that if all
∗-NE of GS yield social welfare at most u, then for any ∗-WSNE (x,y) it holds
that i′ /∈ supp(x).
G ′′ =
j′
3
8
, 3
8
G ′ ...
3
8
, 3
8
i′ 3
8
, 3
8
· · · 3
8
, 3
8
0, 0
Fig. 2: The game G′′.
Lemma 13. If the game Gs posses an ∗-NE with social welfare 68 , then the
game G′′ posses an ∗-WSNE (x,y) such that i′ ∈ supp(x).
Lemma 14. If all the ∗-NE of Gs yield social welfare at most u, then for any ∗-
WSNE (x,y) of G′′ it holds that i′ /∈ supp(x).
We now summarize the results of this section in the following theorem. Given
the game Gs we can construct games G′ and G′′ such that the answer to the
Problems 2 - 10 is “Yes” if Gs possess an ∗-NE with social welfare 38 and “No”
if every ∗-NE of Gs has social welfare at most u.
Theorem 15. Assuming the RETH, any algorithm that solves the Problems 1 - 10
for any constant  < 18 requires n
Ω˜(logn) time.
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